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I. INTRODUCTION
The popularity and increased frequency of occurrence of corporate takeovers
in recent years has spurred a resurgence in state takeover legislation The fed-
eral courts since Edgar v. MITE Corp. (MITE)2 in 1982, have routinely struck
down state takeover laws, giving the SEC wide-ranging authority in takeover
regulation.3 In 1987 the United States Supreme Court in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America (Dynamics)4 upheld an Indiana takeover statute designed to
protect shareholders from the coercive effects of hostile takeovers.' Indiana's
takeover statute provides that the offeror must disclose important information
concerning the tender offer and its effects on the shareholder, and requires that
the shareholders must vote collectively on whether or not the tendered shares
1. Pinto, Takeover Statutes: The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Corporate Law, 41 UNIV. MIA-
MI L. REv. 473, 474 (1987). See generally Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities Regulation of Tender Offers,
46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767 (1971) (outlining the various state statutory responses to the tender offer phenome-
non); Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 OHIO
ST. L. J. 689, 690 n. 7 (1981); Note, A Failed Experiment: State Takeover Regulation After Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 457 n.4 (1983).
2. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
3. Warren, Developments in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and Its Aftermath, 40 Bus. LAW. 671,
686-94 (Feb. 1985).
4. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
5. Id.
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will be sold with voting rights attached. 6 With this decision, the Court spawned
a new wave of state takeover legislation.7 This Note will focus primarily on the
Court's decision in Dynamics and the judicial treatment of the most recent or
"third-generation"8 state takeover legislation instituted subsequent to MITE and
will discuss whether the Court's decision in Dynamics comports with the Con-
stitution.
II. FACTS
On March 10, 1986, Dynamics Corporation of America (Dynamics)9 was the
owner of 9.6 % of the common stock of CTS Corporation (CTS), an Indiana cor-
poration. On that date, Dynamics announced a tender offer10 for another mil-
lion shares in CTS!1 This purchase would have raised Dynamics ownership interest
in CTS to 27.5 % !2 On March 27, 1986, the Board of Directors of CTS elected
to be governed by the provisions of Indiana's newly adopted Indiana Business
Corporation Law 3 The Law included the Control Share Acquisitions Chapter
6. IND. CODE §§ 23-1-42-1 to -I1 (Supp. 1986).
7. "Since CTS, nine states have enacted antitakeover laws - six following hostile takeover bids ...
bringing to 26 the number of States now having such legislation." Sontag, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 5, 1987, at 2.
8. "Third-generation" statutes have been described as those which allow the tender offer to take place,
while severely limiting the offeror's right to vote or to transfer his shares. Pinto, Takeover Statutes: The
Dormant Commerce Clause and State Corporate Law, 41 UNIV. MIAMI L. REV. 473, 474 (1987).
9. Dynamics Corporation of America is a New York corporation with its principal place of business
in Connecticut. Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant CTS Corporation at 3, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987) (No. 86-71).
10. No federal statute or regulation defines the term "tender offer," but a tender offer "has been conven-
tionally understood to be a publicly made invitation addressed to all shareholders of a corporation to tender
their shares for sale at a specified price." Note, The Developing Meaning of Tender Offer" Under The Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1251 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
11. Simultaneously, Dynamics filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, alleging that CTS had violated the federal security laws in a number of respects, none of which
were deemed relevant by the Court in the instant case. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107
S. Ct. 1637, 1642 (1987).
12. By seeking to raise its ownership interest to twenty-seven and one-half percent (27.5%), Dynamics
would be acquiring "control shares," shares that, but for the Act, would bring its voting power in the corpo-
ration to or above any of three thresholds: twenty percent (20%), thirty-three and one-third percent (33 1/3%),
or fifty percent (50%). IND. CODE § 23-1-42-1 (Supp. 1986). These thresholds are much higher than the
5% threshold acquisition that would bring a tender offer under the Williams Act. See Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 13(d)(i), 14(d)(1,5-7)(e) as amended 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1), 78n(d)(1,5-7),(e).
13. IND. CODE 66 23-1-17-1 to -5 (Supp. 1986).
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(Indiana Act)1" which would apply to any "issuing public corporation"15 incor-
porated in Indiana as of August 1, 1987, unless the corporation amended its arti-
cles of incorporation or bylaws to opt out of the Indiana Act? 6 Before that date,
any Indiana corporation could opt into the Indiana Act by resolution of its board
of directors?' By adopting the Indiana Act, CTS subjected the proposed acquisi-
tion of shares by Dynamics to statutory requirements which effectively "condi-
tion[ed] acquisition of control of [the] corporation on approval [by] a majority
of the pre-existing disinterested18 shareholders"19
Dynamics responded to CTS's tender offer on March 31, 1986 by filing a mo-
tion for leave to amend its earlier complaint 20 in order to allege that the Indiana
Act was preempted by the Williams Act21 and violated the commerce clause.
22 .
Dynamics sought a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and
declaratory relief against CTS's use of the Indiana Act. 23 On April 9, 1986, the
14. IND. CODE §§ 23-1-42-1-to -11 (Supp. 1986). The Indiana Act provides that a stock acquisition
of "control shares" which would bring the acquiring entity's voting power to or above certain threshold levels
would not be accompanied by voting rights unless such rights were approved by a majority vote of all pre-
existing disinterested shareholders at a regularly scheduled meeting or a special meeting held within fifty
days if the acquiror follows procedures specified in the Indiana Act. Id. §§ 23-1-42-7 to -9. The term "disin-
terested shareholder" is not defined in the statute; however, "interested shares" are the shares of an issuing
public corporation with respect to which any of the following persons may exercise or direct the voting pow-
er of the corporation in the election of directors:
(1) An acquiring person or member of a group with respect to a control share
acquisition.
(2) Any officer of the issuing public corporation.
(3) Any employee of the issuing public corporation who is also a director for the
corporation.
IND. CODE § 23-1-42-3 (Supp. 1986).
15. An "issuing public corporation" is defined in the Indiana Act as
a corporation that has:
(1) One hundred (100) or more shareholders;
(2) Its principal place of business, its principal office or substantial assets within
Indiana; and
(3) Either:
(A) More than ten percent (10%) of its shareholders resident in Indiana;
(B) More than ten percent (10%) of its shares owned by Indiana residents; or
(C) Ten thousand (10,000) shareholders resident in Indiana.
IND. CODE § 23-1-42-4(a) (Supp. 1986).
16. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-5 (Supp. 1986).
17. IND. CODE § 23-1-17-3(b) (Supp. 1986).
18. See supra note 14.
19. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S.Ct. 1637, 1641 (1987). Under the Indiana Act
"[t]he shareholders decide whether to confer [voting] rights upon the control shares at the next regularly
scheduled meeting of the shareholders, or at a specially scheduled meeting. The acquiror can require manage-
ment of the corporation to hold such a special meeting within fifty days if it: (1) files an "acquiring person
statement" - a document describing, inter alia, the identity of the acquiror and the terms of the proposed
acquisition, (2) requests the meeting and, (3) agrees to pay expenses of the meeting. See IND. CODE § 23-1-42-7
(Supp. 1986).
20. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (d)(e) and 78n (d)-(f) (1982 ed. and Supp. III).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
23. 637 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
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district court ruled that the Williams Act preempted the Indiana Act and grant-
ed Dynamic's motion for declaratory relief.2 A week later,25 on April 17, 1986,
the district court issued an opinion accepting Dynamic's claim that the Act vio-
lated the commerce clause.26 The district court certified its decision for immediate
appeal on the Williams Act and commerce clause claims 2? and CTS appealed
on both claims to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
28
The Court of Appeals held that the Williams Act did preempt the new Indiana
Act and on April 23, 1986, affirmed the decision of the district court.29 The
court also addressed Dynamic's allegation that the Indiana Act conflicted with
the commerce clause. Applying the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. ,3
the court found the Act unconstitutional, holding that "[u]nlike a state's blue sky
law the Indiana statute is calculated to impede transactions between residents
of other states:' 31 Finally, the court addressed the "internal affairs" doctrine
32
and held that "the Indiana Act's regulation by 'jiggering' with voting rights did
not remove the procedure from the scope of judicial review." 33 The United States
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction34and reversed the Court of Appeals.
35
Speaking through Justice Powell, the Court held that the Indiana Act did not
24. Id. Relying on Justice White's plurality opinion in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982),
the district court concluded that the Act "wholly frustrates the purpose and objective of congress in striking
a balance between the investor, management, and the takeover bidder in takeover contests." Id. at 399. The
district court's discussion was limited to the preemption challenge because the Indiana Attorney General had
not been properly certified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) and had not sought to intervene or submit a
statement of position. Id. at 400.
25. CTS had moved to certify the April 9, 1986 opinion for immediate appeal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
The District Court, fearing that the Court of Appeals would remand for resolution of the commerce clause
issue, left unsettled by the April 9 opinion, decided to rule on the alternative commerce clause grounds despite
the state's failure to intervene. Id.
26. That holding rested on the court's conclusion that "the substantial interference with interstate com-
merce created by the [Indiana Act] outweigh[ed] the articulated local benefits so as to create an impermissible
indirect burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 406.
27. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 389 (1986).
28. The Court of Appeals consolidated and expedited the two appeals because CI'S's annual shareholder's
meeting was imminent. CMS Corp. v. Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1643.
29. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986). On the claim that the Wil-
liams Act preempted the Indiana Act the court adopted the analysis of the plurality in MITE and stated that
"very few tender offers could run the gauntlet that Indiana has set up. In any event, if the Williams Act is
to be taken as a congressional determination that a month (roughly) is enough time to force a tender offer
to be kept open, 50 days is too much; and 50 days is the minimum under the Indiana Act if the target corpora-
tion so chooses." Id. at 263.
30. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Under Pike, a state statute affecting interstate commerce is valid "[w]here the
statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate com-
merce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits." Id. at 142, citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S.
440, 443 (1960).
31. Dynamics, 794 F.2d at 264.
32. The "internal affairs" doctrine refers to a "principle of conflict of laws designed to make sure that
the law of only one state shall govern the affairs of a corporation or other association." Id. For a good discus-
sion of the "internal affairs" doctrine in regard to state takeover legislation, see Pinto, supra note 1, at 489-92.
33. Id.
34. CMS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986).
35. Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1644.
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conflict with the provisions or purposes of the Williams Act, was not preempt-
ed by it, 36 and did not offend the commerce clause.
37
HI. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Cash tender offers involving companies with securities listed on national secu-
rities exchanges rose from only eight in 1960, to one-hundred seven in 1967.1
This remarkable rise in the incidence of cash tender offers has been attributed
to a combination of economic, tactical and psychological factors prevalent in
the marketplace during that period.3 Generally, the tender offer is a "less com-
plicated and less time-consuming" method of corporate takeover than are proxy
contests.' Cash offers for controlling amounts of stock were exempt from the
type of federal disclosure requirements applicable to takeover attempts initiated
through proxy contests4 1 or public exchange offers,4 2 and cash tender offers al-
lowed for both secrecy and surprise in a takeover attempt.43
Investors, however, were increasingly placed in circumstances which required
them to make quick and perhaps ill-informed decisions on the retention or sale
of their shares." Proponents of takeover control legislation on both the state
and federal levels argued that shareholders were entitled to relevant information
which would allow them to make informed decisions, because a shift in cor-
porate control resulting from the acquisition of controlling amounts of stock
produces virtually a new company and is arguably a "forced exchange"4 5 for
what is essentially a new security.46
The original proposal for federal regulation of cash tender offers, the Wil-
liams bill,47 was introduced for the ostensible purpose of protecting incumbent
36. Id. at 1648. The Court held 1) that the possibility that the Indiana Act would delay some tender offers
was insufficient to declare it preempted by the Williams Act, and 2) that the Indiana Act was consistent with
the text and purposes of the Williams Act. Id.
37. Id. "Because nothing in the Indiana Act imposes a greater burden on out-of-state offerors than it does
on similarly situated Indiana offerors, we reject the contention that the Act discriminates against interstate
commerce: Id. at 1649, (Powell, J.).
38. 113 CONG. REc. 855 (Jan. 18, 1967) (Remarks of Senator Williams).
39. For a listing of several factors which may have spurred this growth, see Aranow & Einhorn, TENDER
OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 65-66 (1973).
40. Clark, CORPORATE LAW 546 (1986). A "proxy contest" is a dispute between groups attempting to
gain or retain control of the board of directors of a company by using the proxy device to gather sufficient
voting support. 5 W. Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 25052.2 (rev. penn.
ed. 1987).
41. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970).
42. A "public exchange" offer is a technique by which an aggressor corporation seeks to obtain control
over a target corporation by offering to exchange a package of its securities for the target corporation's voting
shares. Hamilton, CORPORATIONS 450 (2d ed. 1987).
43. Clark, CORPORATE LAW 546 (1986).
44. Id. at 547.
45. Id. By "forced exchange" Clark apparently refers to the fact that the individual investors have no con-
trol in such a stock transfer.
46. Id.
47. Ill CONG. REc. 28256-60 (Oct. 22, 1965).
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management from "industrial sabotage" resulting from what were deemed reck-
less corporate raids on "proud old companies."' Such regulation, cited as "unique
in that it represented perhaps the first attempt to enact securities regulation
designed primarily for the benefit of the issuer rather than the investor," was
inspired by the "conglomerate merger mania" of the early and mid 1960's.
49
No Congressional hearings were held on the original Williams bill, but a second
bill introduced by Senator Williams in 1967 included many of the original bill's
proposals.50 Senator Williams remarked that the essential problem in the trans-
fer of control through cash tender offers was that the purchasers were able to
operate in almost complete secrecy, and that this was inconsistent with the dis-
closure pattern generally prevailing in American securities markets because the
competence and integrity of management and controlling persons is of vital im-
portance to stockholders.5"
The new Williams bill was offered to provide investors confronted with a tender
offer with full disclosure of the terms, conditions and financing of the offer,
as well as the identity and background of the person, or group, making the tender
offer. 52 The Senate hearings on the Williams bill reflect the debate over whether
tender offers might promote the best interests of society by providing an effec-
tive method of removing "entrenched but inefficient management" or whether
tender offers were disguised forms of "industrial sabotage" by "corporate raid-
ers" and "takeover pirates.'
5 3
Congress apparently adopted the view that investors faced with takeover bids
were no less entitled to an opportunity to make an informed decision than in-
vestors facing a proxy contest or exchange offer, for in 1968 it passed the Wil-
liams Act54 as an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 55 The
Williams Act added sections 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(e) of the current 1934 Exchange
Act.56 Designed under what has been referred to as a "market approach,"57 the
Williams Act protects investors by favoring neither management nor the takeover
48. Id. (Remarks of Senator Williams on S. 2731).
49. Aranow & Einhom supra note 39, at 64.
50. 113 CONG. REc. 854-56 (1967) (Remarks of Senator Williams on S. 510).
51. Id. at 855.
52. Id.
53. See 113 CONG. REC. 854, 857 (1967) (Remarks by Senator Kuchel on S. 510); See also 113 CONG.
Rac. 24662-66 (1967).
54. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 954 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)-(e),
§ 78 n(d)(f) (1982)).
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
56. The added sections deal with both acquisitions of control shares through market purchases and acqui-
sitions through tender offers, placing similar disclosure requirements on the two types of acquisitions.
57. The "market approach" contemplates a regulatory regimen that, through full disclosure, enables the
investor to determine the merits of a takeover bid. H.R. REP. No. 1711 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted
in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2812. See also Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F2d
1256, 1276 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173
(1979) (The Williams bill "is designed to make the relevant facts known so that shareholders have a fair oppor-
tunity to make their decision." Id.).
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bidder58 in what has been described as a policy of "evenhandedness" ' In the
final analysis, "the Williams Act sought to place tender offers under regulations
designed to give investors the same protections that are accorded investors fac-
ing proxy contests or exchange offers,"6 but was "not intended to either encourage
or discourage tender offers.
'61
A. State Takeover Regulation
In passing the Williams Act, Congress did not explicitly prohibit the states
from regulating takeovers. 62 Consequently, a number of states, 63 "[aicting pur-
suant to their police power64 and under the protection afforded by the savings
clause of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which permits concurrent regula-
tion, 65 enacted a wide variety of takeover laws that differed significantly from
the federal scheme" 66 Generally, these "first-generation" state statutes were "the
result of lobbying by management interests who feared that their companies might
become takeover targets, and so were designed to make hostile takeovers quite
difficult,' chiefly by delaying proceedings of the offeror.67 The need to give share-
58. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982); see 113 CONG. REc. 24664 (1967) (Remarks of
Senator Williams: "We have taken extreme care to avoid tipping the scales either in favor of management
or in favor of the person making the takeover bids." Id.).
59. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 633; Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 31 (1977).
60. H. R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
2811, 2812.
61. Id. at 2813.
62. Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. at 631. See also Note, Securities Law and the Constitution: State Tender
Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L. J. 510, 519 (1979) (The congressional record reveals no intent by
Congress to preempt state regulation of tender offers through the Williams Act. Id.). See generally Wilner
and Landry, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1
(1976) (Congress has not expressly forbidden the states to regulate tender offers.).
63. In the ten year period following passage of the Williams Act, 37 states enacted statutes regulating
tender offers. For a list, See Note, A Failed Experiment: State Takeover Regulation After Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 1983 UNIV. ILL. L. REv. 457, 457 n.4 (1987).
64. U.S. Const. amend. X. See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917) (Prevention of fraud
in the purchase and sale of securities recognized as valid exercise of state police power). See also Edgar
v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) ("protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state objective" Id.
at 644.).
65. 15 U.S.C. §78bb(a) (1934). Nothing in the 1934 Act will affect the jurisdiction of state securities
commissions "insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder." Id. See Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182 n. 13. (The provision "was plainly
intended to protect rather than limit state authority." Id.). See also Wilner and Landry, supra note 62.
66. The neutral stance adopted by the Congress in the Williams Act was not reflected by the states,
which tended to take a more "paternalistic" approach in protecting in-state investors and businesses subjected
to takeovers. Warren, Developments in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and Its Aftermath, 40 Bus. LAW,
671, 674 (1985). Many states adhered to the philosophy embodied in their blue sky laws. See generally Good-
kind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in the Merit Requirements?, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 79 (1976) (State blue
sky laws were typically enacted for the purpose of providing investor protection through a combination of
antifraud, licensing, and registration procedures. Id. at 123.).
67. Clark, CORPORATE LAW 568 (1986). See also Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of
Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HARv. L. REv. 96
(1987) (Indiana's takeover legislation described as special interest legislation designed to benefit local managers
and the local economy).
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holders greater protection than they received under federal law and the exercise
of state police power in order to protect citizens from fraud and coercion were
invoked as justifications. 68 The statutes generally required more extensive dis-
closures than those required at the federal level,69 or required that disclosures
be made prior to commencement of an offer rather than concurrently, as speci-
fied in the Williams Act .70 Some statutes gave a state official the authority to
call an administrative hearing to assess the adequacy of the information disclosed
to the target company investors, and in some instances the official also had the
power to pass upon the substantive "fairness" of the offer. 1 Concurrent state
and federal regulation in the area made conflicts inevitable and tender offerors
frequently challenged the validity of the statutes. In nearly every case the lower
federal courts found such state takeover statutes unconstitutional.
7 2
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court affirmed73 the Seventh Circuit de-
cision in Edgar v. Mite Corp. (MITE). 7 The MITE Court, in a plurality deci-
sion,75 held that the Illinois Business Takeover Act 76 impermissibly burdened
interstate commerce, thereby violating the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution. 77 The Illinois Act was typical of many of what have been termed
"first-generation" statutes. It required that any tender offer for the shares of a
target company be registered with the Illinois Secretary of State.78 In addition,
the statute imposed a twenty-day precommencement waiting period, 79 during
which time state officials could initiate hearings to determine the substantive
fairness of the offer.80 The statute was applicable to any corporation of which
Illinois shareholders owned ten percent of the equity securities subject to the
tender offer, as well as to any corporation satisfying any two of the following
68. Clark, CORPORATE LAW 569 (1986).
69. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1902(b) (1977 & Supp. 1982), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
803(2) (1981 & Supp. 1983-1984), PA. STAT. ANN.. tit. 70 § 75 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
70. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(1) (1980 & Supp. 1983), MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.905(2)
(West Supp. 1983-1984).
71. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 803(1) (1981) (repealed 1985).
72. Note, The Constitutionality of Second Generation Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 203, 207 (1986)
citing
"Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980) (preliminary injunction upheld on ground
that the New Jersey takeover statute was likely to be preempted); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell,
577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978) (Idaho statute unconstitutional on commerce clause and preemption
grounds), rev'd on other grounds sub non., Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979);
Natiomas Co. v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191 (D. Nev. 1981) (Nevada statute unconstitutional on com-
merce clause and preemption grounds); Crane Company v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(Pennsylvania statute unconstitutional on commerce clause and preemption grounds)."
Id. at n. 27.
73. MITE v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), affd sub nom., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624 (1982).
74. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
75. Id. (4-3 vote).
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.51 to 137.52-9 (1979), (repealed 1983).
77. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
78. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.54.A (Smith-Hurd 1979).
79. Id. para. 137.54.E.
80. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.57.E (Smith-Hurd 1979). It was this aspect of the statute
which the Court found to have the most substantial negative impact upon interstate commerce in that the
Commissioner could terminate the offer on his own initiative. 457 U.S. at 626-27.
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criteria: a corporation with its principle executive offices in Illinois, a corpora-
tion organized under the laws of Illinois, or a corporation with at least ten per-
cent of its stated capital and paid-in surplus represented within the state. 81 The
Illinois Act was challenged by a tender offeror on grounds that it was preempted
by the Williams Act and unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce. The
majority in MITE agreed that the Illinois statute was excessively burdensome
when balanced against the state's asserted interests in protecting resident share-
holders from fraudulent and inequitable tender offers, and in regulating internal
affairs of domestic corporations.82 In the Court's view, these interests were sig-
nificantly outweighed by the effect on both nonresident shareholders and for-
eign corporations. 83 The Court held that the protection afforded to resident
shareholders was primarily "speculative" and that any benefits to the shareholders
were outweighed by the likelihood that a target company's management would
ase the delay period to develop tactics to defeat the tender offer.
84
The state's asserted interest in regulating the internal affairs of domestic cor-
porations was also rejected.8 5 The Court, pointing to the fact that the Illinois
statute applied to corporations not incorporated in or having their principal place
of business in Illinois, and the fact that tender offers involve shareholder sales
of stock to third parties and are not included in the internal affairs doctrine any-
way, concluded that the burdens on interstate commerce imposed by the Illinois
Business Takeover Act outweighed the state's interest in regulating tender offers.
8 6
A majority decision was never reached on the preemption issue. Justice White,
with whom Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun concurred, reasoned that
the Illinois provisions for precommencement notice, hearings with no deadlines,
and adjudication of the tender offer's substantive fairness frustrated the objec-
tives of the Williams Act. 87 Justice White considered the possibility of extended
delays under the Illinois scheme to be "outweighed by the increased risk that
the tender offer will fail due to defensive tactics employed by incumbent manage-
ment" 88 Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment,89 but disagreed with Justice
White's view that a state, by providing special protection for incumbent manage-
ment, was in conflict with the federal statute and declined to join the Court in
its preemption holding.
90
81. ILL. STAr ANN. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.52-10(2) (Smith-Hurd 1979).
82. 457 U.S. at 644.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 645.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 646.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 645.
89. Id. at 647.
90. Id. at 655.
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B "Second Generation" State Takeover Legislation
State takeover legislation was struck a harsh blow by MITE, but the commerce
clause reasoning in MITE apparently left "some room for state regulation of tender
offers."91 It was believed by some that the preemption question was still open,
and that the commerce clause holding of MITE could be distinguished with respect
to statutes of narrower scope.92 In response to MITE, several states enacted new
types of takeover legislation formulated so as not to create the "indirect burden"
upon interstate commerce which led to the demise of the Illinois Act in MITE. 
9 3
These so-called "second generation" statutes were aimed not at directly con-
ditioning or restraining the tender offer or the consequent tender of shares, but
rather at regulating the takeover process through manipulation of the internal
affairs of corporations organized under the laws of the state.94 Typically, these
statutes were applicable to corporations incorporated within the state, having
a certain percentage of in-state shareholders, and having the corporation's prin-
cipal executive offices or significant assets located within the state. Further, many
of the statutes included an opting-out or opting-in provision which would per-
mit a corporation to elect whether or not it was to be regulated by the statute.95
Several different statutory models were devised and implemented in an effort
to regulate within the narrowed commerce clause limits. Though most of these
second generation statutes have been held unconstitutional, the litigation con-
cerning them has certainly compressed the scope of state tender offer regulation.
9 6
91. Id. at 646. (Powell, J., concurring opinion).
92. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 603 (1983).
93. See, e.g., ME. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 1-102 (a), 3-601 to -603 (1985 & Supp. 1986);
N. Y. Bus. COuR'. LAW §912 (a)(13) (McKinney 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1701.01 (Y) (Anderson
1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1004, 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1986). Some states enacted statutes requiring
that the target corporation have a specified number of resident shareholders or a certain value of assets main-
tained in the state. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.01 (Y) (Anderson 1985) (requiring that a cor-
poration have fifty shareholders and that the corporation's principal place of business, principal executive
offices, or substantial assets be located in Ohio). Some states merely modified their pre-MITE statutes by
making them applicable only to target shareholders who reside in the state. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 80B (West 1986). "The constitutionality of these modified first generation statutes remains unsettled. Compare
Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984)(upholding Minnesota's modified statute)
with Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp. 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982) (invalidating Michigan's statute
on commerce clause grounds, although the statute had been construed to apply only to resident shareholders)."
Note, supra note 72, at 208, n.32.
94. For a good discussion of the characteristic features of the various models enacted, see generally
Sargent, Do the Second Generation State Takeover Statutes Violate the Commerce Clause? 5 CORP. L. REV.
3 (1984), Pinto, supra note 8, at 478-83. Note, The Constitutionality of Second Generation Takeover Sta-
tutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 203 (1986).
95. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 23-1-17-3(b) (Supp. 1986).
96. See Mesa Petroleum Company v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F. 2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983) (Oklahoma
statute violated commerce clause); Telvest Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983) (Virginia statute
violated commerce clause), Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cit. 1982) (Michi-
gan takeover statute limited to resident shareholders violates the commerce clause); National City Lines,




C 'Third Generation" State Takeover Legislation
Two of the "second generation" statutory models may be singled out from the
others in that they permit the tender offer to take place without interference,
but inhibit the offeror from exercising corporate control by restricting its rights
to vote its newly acquired shares. These models, referred to by one commenta-
tor as the "voting rights model" and the "business combination model" represent
a "third-generation" of state takeover legislation.
9 7
The "business combination model" does not directly affect an offeror's ability
to acquire or vote its shares but restricts the ability of the acquiror as a newly
designated shareholder to use the target's assets after control shares have been
acquired. Approval from the corporation's directors is required before the ac-
quiror may purchase more shares or before it may seek a business combination
with the corporation.9 Failure to receive the necessary director approval precludes
future business combinations between the acquiror and the corporation for a
specified period.99
Under the "voting rights model" °° acquirors who buy control shares, shares
sufficient to provide the buyer with a certain amount of voting control in the
corporation, may be denied voting rights unless they adhere to the statutory re-
quirements. Typically, the statutes require that the disinterested shareholders meet
and vote their approval in order for the offeror to have voting rights in his newly
acquired shares? ° Both the "voting rights" and the "business combination" models
permit the tender offer to take place and thus do not present the direct interfer-
ence of interstate commerce which frequently caused second-generation "share-
holder approval" statutes to be struck down 02
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in the instant case these "third-generation"
statutes had seen little success in the courts. The validity of a statute restricting
97. See Pinto, supra note 8, at 482; Note, The Constitutionality of Second Generation Takeover Sta-
tutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 203, 231-39 (1987).
98. Pinto supra note 8, at 482 n. 53.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. IND. CODE §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (1986). The statute may also restrict the transferability of the shares
and provide for redemption by the target corporation. Id. § 23-1-42-10. Wisconsin has a variation of this
type wherein anyone acquiring in excess of twenty percent of the voting power shall be limited to ten percent
of the voting power of those shares. Wis. STAT. § 180.28(9)(a) (1986).
102. Shareholder approval statutes typically require that the shareholders vote their approval of a tender
offer before it may transpire. See Pinto, supra note 8, at 478-83. The courts, in most cases, have held takeover
statutes which require shareholder approval in order for the transaction to take place to be unconstitutional.
See, e.g., APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Minn. 1985) (requiring
approval by the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the voting power of all shares entitled to
vote), Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (D. Mo. 1985) (requiring a supermajority vote of shareholders
before any shareholder could sell his shares to an offeror seeking control status), Terry v. Yamashita, 643
F. Supp. 161 (D. Hawaii 1986) (requiring a majority shareholder approval), Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Hold-
erman, 637 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ohio 1986), affd 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986) (requiring an affirmative
vote of a majority of the voting power), Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn.
1986) (requiring shareholder approval of certain tenders and not others).
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the shareholder from exercising his voting rights in his shares was first consi-
dered in APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc 03 in which Minnesota's
Control Share Acquisition Act (MCSAA),01 was struck down on commerce clause
grounds. The court concluded that though the MCSAA differed considerably
from the Illinois Act under consideration in Edgar v. MITE Corp., the Min-
nesota statute suffered from many of the same constitutional infirmities s The
benefits were deemed speculative at best and were outweighed by the direct burden
imposed on interstate commerce!Oq However, the Minnesota statute also con-
tained, as penalties for failure to comply with the statute, the denial of voting
and transfer rights for a year and possible redemption at the same price at which
the shares were acquired?07 The validity of these penalties was determined to
be dependent on whether or not the internal affairs doctrine was controlling °8
The court found that the internal affairs doctrine did not apply because the "[r]egu-
lation of shareholders - and those who would become shareholders - is not
the same thing as regulating the corporation itself "71 09
Van Dusen was consistent with MITE in that it was determined that the acqui-
sition of shares does not implicate the internal affairs doctrine. However, the
district court's language indicated that the use of shareholder's power once the
shares have been acquired might well be a proper subject of state regulation" 0
The "voting rights model" was considered by the Seventh Circuit in Dynamics
Corp. of America v. C7S Corp. (C7S)" In C7S, Indiana's Control Share Acqui-
sition Act112 was found to be preempted by the Williams Act and was declared
unconstitutional on interstate commerce grounds 3 The Indiana Act required
approval by a majority of disinterested shareholders before any newly acquired
control shares could be voted by the purchaser of those shares." Although the
offeror was not precluded from acquiring shares, failure to receive shareholder
approval would mean the denial of voting rights and the inability to effect cor-
porate changes. 5 Applying the Pike balancing test, the court found the statute
unconstitutional because it impeded takeovers and interfered with transactions
between nonresident shareholders, with little or no benefit to Indiana or its resi-
103. 622 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Minn. 1985).
104. MINN. LAWS Ch. 488 § 2 (1984).
105. Van Dusen, 622 F. Supp. at 1225.
106. Id. at 1225.
107. Id. at 1219.
108. Id. at 1223.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1223-24.
111. 794 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1986), prob. juris. noted, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107
S. Ct. 258 (1986), rev'd CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
112. IND. CODE. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (Supp. 1986).
113. C7S, 794 F.2d at 250.
114. IND. CODE §§ 23-1-42-7 to -9. See supra note 14.
115. Id. Also, if the offeror failed to file an acquiring person's statement, the corporation could redeem
the shares at "fair value." Id.
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dents. The court recognized "that a state has broad latitude in regulating inter-
nal affairs even if the regulating complicates takeover efforts; but when a statute's
effect on the interstate market in securities and corporate control is direct, in-
tended, and substantial[,] it is not merely the incidental effect of a general regu-
lation of internal corporate governance."
16
IV. INSTANT CASE
This case presented the United States Supreme Court with two issues: whether
the Control Share Acquisitions Chapter of the Indiana Business Corporation Law
117
was preempted by the Williams Act, 1 8 and whether it violated the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution?19
The Court began the opinion by noting that without an explicit indication by
Congress of an intent to preempt state law, a federal statute preempts a state
statute only "where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility" 20 or where the "[state] law stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."21 The
Court reasoned: "[b]ecause it is entirely possible for entities to comply with
both the Williams Act and the Indiana Act, the state statute can be preempted
only if it frustrates the purpose of the federal law.'
22
The Court then proceeded to make a determination as to the intent and pur-
pose of the Williams Act,123 an Act passed in 1968 in response to the increasing
number of hostile tender offers which were previously not regulated by the dis-
closure requirements of the federal securities laws?24 Addressing its 1982 opin-
ion in MITE ,25 in which an Illinois control share acquisition statute!26 was held
unconstitutional as "frustrat[ing] the objectives of the Williams Act,"27 the Court
resolved that MITE did not control because the Indiana Act in the instant case
"operate[d] to protect the independent shareholder against both of the contend-
ing parties" whereas the Illinois statute in MITE "operated to favor management
116. CTS, 794 F.2d at 264. (In Fleet, the court cited with approval the discussion of internal affairs in
CTS, and the distinction between mergers and tender offers found in Van Dusen. Fleet, 637 F. Supp. at
761-63, affd 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing CMS, 794 F.2d at 264; Van Dusen, 622 F. Supp. at 1223-24)).
117. InD. CODE § 23-1-42-1 (Supp. 1986).
118. 82 Stat. 454, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(e) and 78n(d)-(f), (1982 ed. and Supp. 111 1985).
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
120. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978).
121. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
122. Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1644.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1644 (citing Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)) ("The proliferation
of cash tender offers . . . removed a substantial number of corporate control contests from the reach of ex-
isting disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws.") Id.
125. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
126. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.51 to 137.52-9 (1979) (repealed 1983).
127. MITE, 457 U.S. at 635.
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against offerors, to the detriment of shareholders" a2 The Court held that the
Indiana Act operates on the assumption, implicit in the Williams Act, that in-
dependent shareholders faced with tender offers are often at a disadvantage and
that by allowing the shareholders to vote as a group the Act protects them from
coercive aspects of some tender offers' 29 The Court found that the Indiana Act
did not give either management or the offeror an advantage in communicating
with the shareholders about the impending offer and did not impose an indefinite
delay on tender offers as was possible under the Illinois Act in MITE. The Indi-
ana Act did not allow the state government to interpose its views of fairness be-
tween willing buyers and sellers of shares of the target company but "allows
shareholders to evaluate the fairness of the offer collectively"
30
The Court rejected the reasoning of the Court of Appeals: (1) that no rational
offeror would purchase shares until it gained assurance that those shares would
carry voting rights; and (2) that the Act's fifty-day delay conflicted with the SEC's
shorter twenty-business day minimum period for which a tender offer may be
held open?3' The Court held that "[t]he Act does not impose an absolute 50-day
delay on tender offers, nor does it preclude an offeror from purchasing shares
as soon as federal law permits" 32 Further, the Indiana Act provides "that full
voting rights will be vested - if this eventually is to occur - within 50 days
after the commencement of the offer . 33 Because the fifty-day period was wi-
thin the sixty-day maximum period Congress established for tender offers in 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5),'34 the Court was unwilling to characterize "a delay within
that congressionally determined period [as] unreasonable.
35
The Court noted that, if the Williams Act were construed to preempt any state
statute which might limit or delay the free exercise of power after a successful
tender offer, the Williams Act would preempt a variety of state corporate laws
of "hitherto unquestioned validity" 36 The possibility that the Indiana Act would
delay some tender offers was held to be insufficient to require a conclusion that
the Williams Act preempted the Indiana Act?
37
The Court also addressed whether the Act violated the commerce clause of
the United States Constitution a Dynamics alleged that the statute was imper-
missibly discriminatory under the Constitution because it would apply most often
128. Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1645.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1646 (original emphasis).
131. Id. at 1647.
132. Id. "The Williams Act permits tender offers to be conditioned on the offeror's subsequently obtain-




136. Id. at 1647.




to out-of-state entities. Dynamics based this contention upon the premise that,
as a practical matter, most hostile tender offers are launched by offerors outside
of Indiana? 39 The Court rejected this argument "[b]ecause nothing in the Indi-
ana Act impose[d] a greater burden on out-of-state offerors than it [did] on simi-
larly situated Indiana offerors.74 The Court stated that the Act did not adversely
affect interstate commerce by "subjecting activities to inconsistent regulations1 41
and "[s]o long as each State regulates voting rights only in the corporations it
has created, each corporation will be subject to the law of only one State"1
42
Dynamics also argued that the state had "no legitimate interest in protecting the
nonresident shareholder."' 3 The Court flatly rejected this argument saying that
Indiana has a substantial interest in preventing the corporate form from acting
as a "shield for unfair business dealing."'" The Court reasoned that because "the
Indiana Act applies only to corporations that have a substantial number of share-
holders in Indiana, every application of the Indiana Act will effect a substantial
number of Indiana residents, whom Indiana indisputably has an interest in pro-
tecting."14 Dynamics argument that the Act was unconstitutional ultimately rested
on the contention that the Act would limit the number of successful tender offersYl
However, the Court noted that the "Act did not prohibit any entity - resident
or nonresident - from offering to purchase, or from attempting thereby to gain
control. It only provides regulatory procedures designed for the better protec-
tion of the corporation's shareholders
" 47
Justice Scalia, concurring only as to the preemption ruling, was of the opin-
ion that the judiciary is ill-suited to determine "whether the burden on com-
merce imposed by a state statute is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits,' and should undertake to do so rarely, if at all Justice Scalia
agreed with the Court that the Indiana Act was not preempted by the Williams
Act?" His conclusion was based not on any declared purpose of the two sta-
tutes, but upon the anti-preemption provision of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934? 5 The 1934 Act provides that nothing it contains "shall affect the juris-
diction of the securities commission (or any agency or officer performing like
functions) of any State over any security or any person insofar as it does not
conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereun-




143. Id. at 1651.
144. Id. at 1651-52.




149. Id. at 1653.
150. Id.; see also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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der."51 Justice Scalia agreed that "[u]nless it serve[d] no function, that language
foreclose[d] pre-emption on the basis of conflicting 'purpose' as opposed to con-
flicting 'provision' "152
Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens (as to Part II of the
opinion) dissented. Justice White argued that the Indiana Act "undermine[d] the
policy of the Williams Act by effectively preventing minority shareholders, in
some circumstances, from acting in their own best interests by selling their
stock ."' 3 Justice White was of the opinion that the Indiana Act would "substan-
tially burden the interstate market in corporate ownership" thereby directly in-
hibiting interstate commerce in conflict with the commerce clause
54
V. ANALYSIS
The Court was not bound by its plurality opinion in MITE because the Indiana
Act was recognized as being fundamentally different in operation from the Illinois
Act invalidated in MITE 55 In light of MITE, Indiana's "third-generation" takeover
statute was drafted more narrowly to avoid the constitutional pitfalls which in-
validated the Illinois statute 56 On its face, the Indiana Act appears to protect
the independent shareholder in the spirit of the Williams Act, by 1) affording
the shareholder information concerning the tender offer, 2) providing the share-
holders the power to protect their interest in the corporation by blocking the
transfer of voting rights on acquired "control shares" while, 3) permitting the
tender offer to take place without imposing indefinite or unreasonable delays 5
7
However, in operation, and contrary to the stated purposes of the Williams Act, 58
the Indiana Act will 1) effectively prevent some tender offers from taking place,
2) potentially impair the individual shareholder's freedom to sell his shares for
profit in a takeover bid and 3) interfere with the operation of tender offers without
sufficient justification.
A. The Preemption Issue
The Dynamics Court clearly recognized that because concurrent compliance
151. Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1653.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1653-54.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1645. First generation statutes such as the Illinois Act in MITE generally regulated the tender
offer phase of the takeover. The statutes tended to be more restrictive than the Williams Act, placing signifi-
cant restrictions and requirements on the tender offer itself, and generally permitted extensive intervention
into the process by state officials. See generally Clark, CORPORATE LAW 546 (1986); see supra notes 63-71
and accompanying text.
156. Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1644-46.
157. Id.
158. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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with both the Williams Act and the Indiana Act is possible, the Indiana Act would
be preempted only if it frustrated the purposes of federal legislation' 59 Dynam-
ics' argument that the Indiana Act impermissibly delays tender offers by its re-
quirement of prior shareholder approval on the transfer of voting rights was found
to be illusory 6 Reasoning that "if Congress had intended to pre-empt all state
laws that delay the acquisition of voting control following a tender offer, it would
have said so explicitly," the Court held that "the possibility that the Indiana Act
[would] delay some tender offers [was] insufficient to require a conclusion that
the Williams Act pre-empt[ed] the [Indiana] Act "' 61 The Court distinguished
the possible delay under the Indiana Act from the potential of indefinite delay
apparent in MITE and held that a delay within the congressionally determined
period of sixty days162 would not be unreasonable2
63
The Court determined that the implementation of a "conditional tender offer"6
could sufficiently protect an offeror who feared an adverse shareholder vote'
65
Dynamics argued that a conditional tender offer is not an adequate alternative
because conditional offers leave current management in place for three extra
weeks with "free rein to take other defensive steps that will diminish the value
of the tendered shares."'166 The Court found this argument insufficient because
by taking actions designed to diminish the value of the corporation's shares,
management may incur liability under state law
67
The Court reasoned that the possibility of delay which might result from the
shareholder approval requirement was no more egregious than the inherent de-
lays imposed by a variety of state laws of "hitherto unquestioned validity" such
as corporate laws permitting corporations to stagger the terms of their direc-
159. Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1644.
160. Id. at 1647.
161. Id. at 1648.
162. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982 ed. and Supp. III).
163. Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1638. In MITE, the Court concluded that the Illinois Act offered "investor
protection at the expense of investor autonomy - an approach quite in conflict with that adopted by Con-
gress." 457 U.S. at 640 (citing, MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 494). The MITE Court struck down
the Illinois Act containing provisions for a hearing to review the tender offer because no deadline was estab-
lished to limit the length of such a hearing and provisions requiring the Illinois Secretary of State to deter-
mine the substantive fairness of the offer and bar it at his discretion. Id.
164. In a conditional tender offer:
all shareholders are invited to tender their shares . . . . the bidder may set an upper limit on
the number of shares he will purchase. In addition, the bidder may condition the offer on
the tendering of a minimum number of shares. Tendered shares are placed with a depository
until the expiration of the offer period. At that time, if the conditions of the offer have been
satisfied, the bidder will purchase the tendered shares according to the terms of the offer and
the requirements of the regulatory scheme.
Note, The Constitutionality of Second Generation Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 203 n. 1 (1987).
165. Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1647.
166. Brief for Appellee Dynamics Corp. of America at 37, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,
107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987) (No. 86-71).
167. Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1647.
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tors? 68 The Court's determination that the Indiana Act was not preempted by
the Williams Act clearly rested on the fact that any delay imposed by the Indi-
ana Act was "consistent with the text and purpose of the Williams Act.' 169 The
Court, however, ignored the fact that a termination of a tender offer resulting
from a failure of a majority of the target's shareholders to confer voting rights
upon the control shares sought results directly in the loss of a sale by share-
holders who have tendered their shares. Justice White, arguing in dissent, recog-
nized this oversight and in recalling the earlier finding of the MITE plurality,
stated: "Congress ... did not want to deny shareholders 'the opportunities which
result from the competitive bidding for a block of stock of a given company,'
namely, the opportunity to sell shares for a premium over the market price."
1 70
The Dynamics Court merely assumed that the collective vote provision would
be beneficial to shareholders, and apparently relied on an SEC finding171 that
shareholders might be coerced into selling their shares early to avoid being forced
to sell at a depressed price later?72 The Court's apparent deference to the state
legislature"73 and to the SEC report, with its conclusion that the shareholders
might be coerced by "two-tier" 7 4 tender offers to sell early, is unfortunate.
Although the Court's concern for the protection of the shareholder may be well
founded, the Court, by focusing on the consistencies between the federal and
state regulations, has overlooked the apparent conflicts. The Court appears to
ascribe a motivating concern for the corporation's best interest, which may not
exist, to the individual shareholder's decision to sell or keep his stock./75 One
shareholder faced with a tender offer may wish to sell his stock at a profit in
complete disregard of the corporation's best interest. Another shareholder may
wish to retain his stock in the belief that a takeover would be injurious to the
corporation. The Court's holding is silent as to whether the Indiana Act con-
flicts with the stated purpose of the Williams Act in protecting the individual
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1648.
170. Id. at 1654 (citing Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624, 633 n.9 (1982)) (remarks of Sen. Javits from
113 CONG. REc. 24666 (1967)).
171. Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing and Non-Tender Offer Purchase Programs, Exchange Act Release
No. 21,079 [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) para. 83,637 at 86,914 (June 21, 1984).
172. Id.; see Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1651 ("the possibility of coercion in some takeover bids offers
additional justification for Indiana's decision to promote the autonomy of independent shareholders").
173. Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1651 ("We are not inclined to 'second-guess the experienced judgments
of lawmakers concerning the utility of the legislation.'" Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S.
662, 679 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment)).
174. A two-tier bid usually involves an acquisition that is accomplished in two steps. In the first step,
the bidder uses a tender offer to buy, at a premium price and generally for cash, enough shares to establish
a controlling position in the target. Once control is established, the offeror will take the second step in the
acquisition, a merger of the target into the bidder or a subsidiary, thus freezing out minority shareholders
with a forced acceptance of cash or securities valued at a lower price than the original tender offer. The
second step merger generally is disclosed in the tender offer materials and usually involves securities of
the bidder. Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing and Non-Tender Offer Purchase Programs, supra note 170 at
86,914 n. 1.
175. See Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1652.
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shareholder's right to decide whether to keep or to sell his stock. Although the
Court stated that it was not bound by MITE, the opinion does not reject the MITE
plurality's finding that Congress, in passing the Williams Act, intended that in-
vestors and the takeover offeror would be free to go forward without unreasona-
ble delay 7" and that investors would be free to make their own decisions 77 By
upholding the statute, the Court has either equated the trading motives of the
individual shareholder with the motives of the majority in a collective vote or
has determined that the interest of the collective majority is superior to that of
the individual investor. In either case, the Court has strayed from the articulat-
ed purpose of the Williams Act which was "to make the relevant facts known
so that shareholders have a fair opportunity to make their decision''178 and to
protect "investor autonomy.1
"7
State corporation laws typically permit shareholders to amend articles of in-
corporation or bylaws to include such collective approval provisions should the
shareholders desire them. The Indiana Act makes a majority shareholder vote
mandatory unless the shareholders vote to opt out of the Act' 80 In large corpo-
rations trading on the national exchange, and where the bulk of the voting con-
trol is in the hands of management through proxies, a majority shareholder vote
to opt out is extremely unlikely to succeed unless management favors the takeover.
Imposing such voting requirements by statute creates the potential for a con-
trolling majority to effectively block tender offers by defeating the transfer of
voting rights and to prevent the corporation from ever opting out of the Act as well.
Should a tender offer be voted down or fail due to the delay imposed by the
requirement of a collective shareholder vote, the individual shareholder who
desired to tender his shares would have lost the opportunity to sell his shares
at a premium. The decision of "whether to buy or to sell [is] taken out of the
hands of the shareholder and the purchaser and placed in the hands of manage-
ment and the other shareholders.""
Further, the statute substantially encroaches upon the individual shareholder's
176. MITE, 457 U.S. at 639.
177. Id. at 639-40 (quoting MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 494).
178. MITE, 457 U.S. at 639-40; accordMITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486,494 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing
H.R. RaP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess; Senate Report at 3).
179. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d. 486, 494, affd sub nom Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624
(1982). The Williams Act contemplates "unfettered choice by well informed visitors." Id. Investor protec-
tion under the Williams Act is aimed at the individual investor rather than shareholders of a corporation
collectively. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir., 1978), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom, Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
180. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-5 (Supp. 1986).
181. Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1420 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (statute requiring prior shareholder
approval before sale could take place held unconstitutional). See also Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp.
161 (D. Hawaii 1986) (prior shareholder approval requirement unconstitutional), Fleet Aerospace Corp.
v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ohio 1986)(prior shareholder approval requirement unconstitutional),
Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1986) (prior shareholder approval require-
ment unconstitutional).
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right to sell his stock at a premium in instances where an offer is thwarted by
the failure to obtain majority approval of the transfer of voting rights on control
shares. Although the degree to which the statute will actually inhibit the sale
of stock by individual shareholders on a national level is difficult to quantify,
both of the above results are certainly contrary to the intent of the Williams Act
of furthering investor autonomy and permitting the individual investor to decide
for himself whether to buy or sell.
B. The Commerce Clause Issue
The commerce clause grants Congress the power "[tlo regulate Com-
merce . . . among the several States .. ' ,182 The states have long been pro-
hibited from taking certain actions respecting interstate commerce in the absence
of congressional action 83 Yet, the line between "those regulations that the com-
merce clause permits and those regulations that it prohibits" remains undefined.8
State authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to
define the voting rights of shareholders, is firmly establishedVa5 "Every state
in the United States has enacted laws regulating corporate governance. '186 These
laws regulate a variety of corporate transactions and can make it more difficult
for corporations to engage in certain activities which substantially affect share-
holder interests. For example, many states require supermajority votes to ap-
prove mergers07 Others require a corporation to purchase the shares of dissenting
shareholders who disagree with corporate decisions08
The Dynamics Court, in traditional fashion,189 first scrutinized the Indiana Act
to determine whether it discriminated against interstate commerce or subjected
interstate commerce to inconsistent regulations?90 Finding that it did neither,
the Court, rather than attempting to employ the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce
182. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
183. See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1852) (prohibiting the states
from regulating objects that are national in nature or that are best regulated by one uniform system).
184. Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1648, see, e.g., Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S.
429, 441, n. 15 (1978) (discussing the local versus national theory, the direct versus indirect affects theory
and the distinction between the exercise of police power and the regulation of commerce).
185. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 304 (1971).
186. Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1650.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36-37 (1980); Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); see generally Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Mak-
ing Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986) (discussing Supreme Court
commerce clause analysis).
190. Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1649; e.g., Brown-Forman Distiller's Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986); Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. at 642; Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.). See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325
U.S. 761 (1945), Cooley v. Board of Wardens, supra, 56 U.S. (12 How.) 299 at 319 (prohibiting the states




Church'91 as did the lower federal court 92 in its ruling, applied a simpler cost-
benefit analysis more akin to that seen in South Carolina State Highway Dep't
v. Barnwell Bros.193 Under Barnwell, should the Court determine that an issue
is one better suited to state regulation, it simply defers to the will of the State
legislature 94 The Dynamics Court held that the limited extent to which the In-
diana Act affected interstate commerce was justified by the State's interest in
defining the attributes of shares in its corporations and in protecting shareholders?95
The reason for the Court's reluctance to apply the Pike balancing test is not ex-
pressed in the majority opinion. Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, voiced
his view that the Court is ill-suited to determine "whether the burden on com-
merce imposed by a state statute 'is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits.' "196 The Court relied chiefly on its determination that the Indi-
ana Act does not prohibit either a resident or nonresident from offering to pur-
chase, or from actually purchasing, shares in an Indiana corporation 97 Under
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,98 which rejected the "notion that the
commerce clause protects the particular structure or methods of operation in
a . market" the facial neutrality of the Indiana Act would satisfy commerce
clause concerns. 9
The Dynamics Court recognized that "[a] state has an interest in promoting
stable relationships among parties involved in the corporations it charters, as
well as ensuring that investors in such corporations have an effective voice in
corporate affairs . . . but that the primary purpose of the [Indiana] Act is to
protect the shareholders of Indiana corporations. 2 ' The Court held that Indi-
ana has a substantial interest in "preventing the corporate form from becoming
a shield for unfair business dealing" and that because "every application of the
Indiana Act will effect a substantial number of Indiana residents ...[the] limited
extent [to which] the [Indiana] Act affects interstate commerce . . . is justified
by the State's interest in defining the attributes of shares in its corporations and
in protecting shareholders."201 Dynamics' argument that the Indiana Act would
191. 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (under Pike, the Court would weigh the burden imposed on interstate com-
merce by the state statute to see whether it was clearly excessive compared to the putative local benefits).
192. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). Application of the Pike balancing test by the lower
court drew the criticism of Justice Scalia, who was of the opinion that an inquiry into whether the burden
on commerce imposed by a state statute "is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits," is
a function "ill suited" to the judiciary. Justice Scalia would have declared the Indiana Act valid under the
Court's holding that it neither "discriminates against interstate commerce," nor "createls] an impermissible
risk of inconsistent regulation by different states." id.
193. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
194. Id.
195. Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1652.
196. Id. (citing Pike, 397 U.S. at 142).
197. Id.
198. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
199. Id. at 127.
200. Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1651.
201. Id. at 1651-52.
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substantially limit the number of successful tender offers was considered by the
Court to be illusory and, even if found to be true, would not have "substantially
affect[ed] [the Court's] commerce clause analysis."202 However, the Court's defer-
ence to the rationale of Indiana's legislature or to claimed prospective benefits
to shareholders is questionable in that any benefit to shareholders is purely specula-
tive, if not illusory. Further, the real force behind the statute is arguably a state
legislative interest in "protecting local businesses from the rigors of the inter-
state market for corporate control" by creating a chilling effect on tender offers.2°3
The Court noted that although corporate law has an inherent extra-territorial
impact, it is nonetheless traditionally within the realm of state lawmaking.
2°4
The Court may have recognized an implicit consent by shareholders to be governed
by state law, "thereby eliminating at least part of the justification for heightened
federal court scrutiny."205 The implication of the holding is that, where the ef-
fects of a state statute on interstate commerce are facially neutral, the Court will
not attempt to weigh burdens and benefits but will simply defer to the state legis-
latures. 206 The Court's apparent rejection of the Pike analysis as the proper test
of the facially neutral Indiana Act leaves the Court without a means to effective-
ly weigh the effect such collective vote provisions have on the interstate trade
of corporate shares. There is precedent, however, for the Court to look past the
facial neutrality to measure whether the statute negatively impacts interstate com-
merce.20 7 The likelihood that the Indiana Act will work disproportionately to
discriminate against out-of-state offerors is arguably sufficient to warrant look-
ing behind the statute. The Court's reluctance to look behind Indiana's facially
neutral statute may stem more from a desire not to embark upon interpretations
of legislative intent in the area than from any degree of faith in the legislative
process. Would a statute similar to Indiana's, but requiring supermajority ap-
proval before voting rights may be transferred on control shares, also be held
constitutional? Under the Court's present analysis it arguably would be.
VI. CONCLUSION
With Dynamics, the Court has created a commerce clause niche into which
202. Id. at 1652.
203. Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on CTS Corp.
v. Dynamics Corp. Of America, 101 HARV. L. REv. 96, 107 (1987) (original emphasis).
204. See Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1649-51.
205. Langevoort, supra note 203 at n.45.
206. However, the district court record which the Dynamics Court was reviewing was practically devoid
of any evidence on the effect of the statute or its legislative intent. Perhaps, given more detailed evidence
from both parties, the Court might distinguish Dynamics and apply a Pike balancing test.
207. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (North Carolina
statute whose clear purpose was to favor local economic interests by discriminating against out-of-state in-
terests held unconstitutional); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (city statute having
discriminatory effects on interstate commerce struck down).
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state legislatures may shelter anti-takeover legislation from judicial scrutiny. The
Dynamics analysis leaves no room to incorporate the adverse effects that the
statute imposes on interstate commerce by preventing shareholders from selling
their shares in instances where the offeror withdraws due to the chilling effect
of the statute. By simply including a statement in such legislation stating that
it was designed to protect shareholders from fraud and coercion during takeover
actions, state lawmakers, subject to corporate lobbying interests, can pass anti-
takeover laws which infringe upon the rights of individual shareholders to trade
their shares. By validating the majority shareholder approval provision, the Court
has taken the decision of whether to buy or sell out of the hands of the individu-
al shareholder and given it to management and a collection of shareholders. A
shareholder who decides to sell will be thwarted by a failure of the disinterested
shareholders to approve the transfer of voting rights. The Supreme Court's defer-
ence to state legislative intent leaves the individual shareholder with no recourse
if his right to buy and sell his stock on the national market is encroached upon.
Though the implementation of a balancing test is difficult and imperfect at best,
it would at least permit the shareholder's right to trade his shares to be weighed
in the preemption analysis. A balancing test would also allow for any infringe-
ment upon free trade to be considered as a violation of the commerce clause.
Alternatively, the Court could elect to uphold only the "least restrictive means
of achieving a reasonable legislative goal.72°8 Under such an approach, the Court
might find that a statute permitting the shareholders to opt-in rather than opt-
out of the scope of the law sufficient to protect the shareholder from fraud and
coercion during a hostile takeover bid. Similarly, the Court might find fair price
statutes or the power of the shareholders to pass their own shareholder approval
amendments to corporate bylaws would be sufficient to fulfill legislative aims.
By simply validating the majority shareholder approval provision, the Court,
in effect, has defined a model provision for state legislatures to follow and has
provided the means by which states may enact laws to protect in-state corpora-
tions from hostile takeovers. 209 Multiplication of such provisions will have a chill-
ing effect on tender offers and interfere with the free trade of stock on a national
level.
Louis B. Lanoux
208. Langevoort, supra note 202 at 108. See also Dean Milk, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (availability of reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives contributed to statute being struck down).
209. See supra note 7.
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